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I. INTRODUCTION
A parent's potential liability for child support includes both
prospective and retroactive liability. Retroactive liability for child
support has received little attention from commentators on North
Carolina law. It includes any remedy that allows a court to change
a present support obligation, after looking back in time, to reflect
history. Retroactive remedies are directed to past events, rather
than to the future needs of the child.
The ratification of Chapter 50, section 13.10 of the North Car-
olina General Statutes,' effective October 1, 1987, now focuses at-
tention on the retroactive modifiability of court-ordered child sup-
port obligations in this state. Retroactive liability for child
support, however, is not limited to retroactive changes in court-
ordered support. The concept also includes retroactive changes in
contractual child support obligations, as well as several miscellane-
ous remedies that allow a court to reimburse a parent, the state, or
a third-party provider of necessaries for past expenditures on the
child's behalf.
II. RETROACTIVE MODIFICATION OF COURT-ORDERED CHILD
SUPPORT
Nationally, proponents of stronger methods of child support
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.10 (1987).
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enforcement have criticized retroactive modification of court-
ordered child support as a loophole that allows parents to avoid
financial responsibility for their children. In North Carolina, how-
ever, the remedy has been used on a limited basis to prevent injus-
tice in some situations. The new section 50-13.10 appears to mod-
ify substantially the body of case law that allowed retroactive
modification of court-ordered child support in North Carolina.' It
provides in part:
Past due child support vested; not subject to retroactive modifica-
tion; entitled to full faith and credit.-(a) Each past due child
support payment is vested when it accrues and may not thereaf-
ter be vacated, reduced, or otherwise modified in any way for any
reason, in this State or any other state, except that a child sup-
port obligation may be modified as otherwise provided by law,
and a vested past due payment is to that extent subject to divest-
ment, if, but only if, a written motion is filed, and due notice is
given to all parties either:
(1) before the payment is due or
(2) if the moving party is precluded by physical disability, mental
incapacity, indigency, misrepresentation of another party, or
other compelling reason from filing a motion before the payment
is due, then promptly after the moving party is no longer so
precluded.
(b) A past due child support payment which is vested pursuant to
G.S. 50-13.10(a) is entitled, as a judgment, to full faith and credit
in this State and any other state, with the full force, effect, and
attributes of a judgment of this State, except that no arrearage
shall be entered on the judgment docket of the clerk of superior
court or become a lien on real estate, nor shall execution issue
thereon, except as provided in G.S. 50-13.4(f)(8) and (10). 3
2. This article discusses the effect of recently enacted N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-
13.10 (1987) on retroactive modification of North Carolina child support orders by
North Carolina courts. A discussion of modification in North Carolina of orders
rendered by courts of other states is beyond the scope of this article.
3. The remainder of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.10 provides that:
(c) As used in this section, 'child support payment' includes all pay-
ments required by court or administrative order in civil actions and ex-
pedited process proceedings under this Chapter, by court order in pro-
ceedings under Chapter 49 of the General Statutes, and by agreements
entered into and approved by the court under G.S. 110-132 or G.S. 110-
133.
(d) For purposes of this section, a child support payment or the rele-
vant portion thereof, is not past due, and no arrearage accrues:
(1) from and after the date of the death of the minor child for
1987]
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Before the enactment of section 50-13.10, North Carolina re-
jected the view of some states4 that a right to payments of court-
ordered child support vested absolutely when the court entered the
order.' A North Carolina court, therefore, was not precluded from
retroactively reducing the amount due under a prior court order
for child support. Few North Carolina decisions, however, allowed
such a reduction of arrearages, 7 and recent cases indicated that ret-
roactive reduction should be allowed only to prevent an injustice.'
whose support the payment, or relevant portion, is made;
(2) from and after the date of the death of the supporting
party;
(3) during any period when the child is living with the sup-
porting party pursuant to a valid court order or to an express or
implied written or oral agreement transferring primary custody to
the supporting party;
(4) during any period when the supporting party is incarcer-
ated, is not on work release, and has no resources with which to
make the payment.
(e) When a child support payment which is to be made to a clerk of
superior court is not received by the clerk when due, the payment is not
a past due child support payment for purposes of this section, and no
arrearage accrues, if the payment is actually made to and received on
time by the party entitled to receive it and such receipt is evidenced by a
cancelled check, money order, or contemporaneously executed and dated
written receipt. Nothing in this section shall affect the duties of the
clerks under this Chapter or Chapter 110 of the General Statutes with
respect to payments not received by them on time, but the court, in any
action to enforce such a payment, may enter an order directing the clerk
to enter the payment on his records as having been made on time, if the
court finds that the payment was in fact received by the party entitled to
receive it as provided in this subsection.
4. Adair v. Superior Court, 44 Ariz. 139, 33 P.2d 995 (1934); Ramona v.
Ramona, 244 So. 2d 547 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971); Davis v. Davis, 145 Kan. 282,
65 P.2d 562 (1937); Fainberg v. Rosen, 12 Md. App. 359, 278 A.2d 630 (1971);
Jenkins v. Jenkins, 453 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970); Mandel v. Mandel, 80
N.Y.S.2d 95 (1947); Gilbert v. Hayward, 37 R.I. 303, 92 A. 625 (1914); Wilburn v.
Wilburn, 59 Wash. 2d 799, 370 P.2d 968 (1962); Foregger v. Foregger, 40 Wis. 2d
632, 162 N.W.2d 553 (1968).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 6-61.
6. No North Carolina case has addressed the question of whether a court has
the authority to increase retroactively the amount of child support payments due
under a prior court order. For a general discussion of the availability of this rem-
edy in other states, see Annotation, Retrospective Increase in Allowance for Ali-
mony, Separate Maintenance or Support, 52 A.L.R.3d 156 (1973).
7. See infra notes 8-61.
8. Brower v. Brower, 75 N.C. App. 425, 434, 331 S.E.2d 170, 176 (1985); Sim-
mons v. Simmons, 74 N.C. App. 725, 727, 329 S.E.2d 723, 724 (1985); Jones v.
[Vol. 10:111
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North Carolina courts recognized exigencies justifying a decrease
in child support arrearages to prevent injustice in two situations.
Courts allowed credit against arrearages due under a court order
for:
(1) voluntary expenditures9 made by the noncustodial parent
on the child's behalf'0 ; and
(2) an amount equal to the amount due under the order dur-
ing the period of time after the parent's duty to support had
terminated."
The decision of whether to reduce arrearages and if so, by how
much, is within the trial court's discretion. 2 The decision is re-
viewable on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.'3
A. Retroactive Reduction by Allowing Credit for Voluntary
Expenditures
The North Carolina Court of Appeals first articulated guide-
lines for granting a credit for voluntary expenditures against child
support arrearages in Goodson v. Goodson.4
We think that the better view allows credit when equitable con-
siderations exist which would create an injustice if credit were not
allowed. Such a determination necessarily must depend upon the
facts and circumstances in each case .... However, since we are
enunciating this principle for the first time in this State, we feel a
duty to offer some guidelines for the trial judge. The delinquent
parent is not entitled as a matter of law to credit for all expendi-
tures which do not conform to the decree. Nor should the delin-
quent parent be entitled to credit for obligations incurred prior to
the time of the entry of the support order. . . . The delinquent
Jones, 52 N.C. App. 104, 109, 278 S.E.2d 260, 263 (1981); Lynn v. Lynn, 44 N.C.
App. 148, 151, 260 S.E.2d 682, 685 (1979); Goodson v. Goodson, 32 N.C. App. 76,
81, 231 S.E.2d 178, 182 (1977). See Reavis v. Reavis, 82 N.C. App. 77, 82, 345
S.E.2d 460, 463 (1986) ("compelling equitable circumstances exist").
9. The term "voluntary expenditures" in this context means expenditures
not required under a court order.
10. See infra discussion at notes 14-50.
11. See infra discussion at notes 51-61.
12. Simmons, 74 N.C. App. at 727, 329 S.E.2d at 724; Jones, 52 N.C. App. at
109, 278 S.E.2d at 264; Lynn, 44 N.C. App. at 151, 260 S.E.2d at 685. But see
infra text accompanying notes 20-22.
13. Simmons, 74 N.C. App. at 728, 329 S.E.2d at 724; see also Jones, 52 N.C.
App. at 109, 278 S.E.2d at 264; Lynn, 44 N.C. App. at 151, 260 S.E.2d at 685.
14. 32 N.C. App. 76, 231 S.E.2d 178.
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parent is not entitled as a matter of law to a deduction propor-
tionate to the amount of time spent with the child. Credit is not
likely to be appropriate for frivolous expenses or for expenses in-
curred in entertaining or feeding the child during visitation peri-
ods. Credit is more likely to be appropriate for expenses incurred
with the consent or at the request of the parent with custody.
Payments made under compulsion of circumstances are also more
likely to merit credit for equitable reasons . . . . See 47 A.L.R.
3d, supra, at §§ 5, 6, 7, 15-19. We emphasize that these are not
hard and fast rules, and that the controlling principle is that
credit is appropriate only when an injustice would exist if credit
were not given. 6
Although the Goodson court expressly recognized the credit theory
for voluntary expenditures in 1977, few cases after Goodson dealt
with it. The court of appeals subsequently said the theory was
"used with considerable reluctance." 6 The reluctance could be at-
tributed, at least in part, to a desire to avoid "injustice to the cus-
todial parent, who is entitled to rely on the continuation of mone-
tary payments to defray necessary living expenses for the
children.
17
North Carolina cases dealing with credit for voluntary expend-
itures fall into two categories. The cases involve credit for support
expenses incurred generally while the child was temporarily living
with the parent requesting the credit" and credit for specific vol-
untary expenditures on the child's behalf incurred while the child
was living with the custodial parent.1 9
1. Credit for Support Expenses Incurred While the Child
Was Living Temporarily With the Parent Requesting Credit
Although the Goodson2" court claimed that it decided the is-
sue for the first time in North Carolina, 1 in two prior cases the
supreme court and the court of appeals held that arrearages due
under a court order for child support should be reduced by the
amount of the payments due during the period the child lived with
15. Id. at 81, 231 S.E.2d at 182 (emphasis added).
16. Gates v. Gates, 69 N.C. App. 421, 429, 317 S.E.2d 402, 407 (1984).
17. Jones, 52 N.C. App. at 109, 278 S.E.2d at 263. Accord Lynn, 44 N.C. App.
at 152, 260 S.E.2d at 685.
18. See infra discussion at notes 20-45.
19. See infra discussion at notes 46-49.
20. 32 N.C. App. 76, 231 S.E.2d 178 (1977).
21. Id. at 81, 231 S.E.2d at 182.
[Vol. 10:111
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the parent requesting reduction.22 Neither court offered any expla-
nation for its determination, implying that the parent was entitled
to reduction as a matter of law.23
However, in two subsequent cases, Simmons v. Simmons and
Jones v. Jones, the court of appeals followed Goodson24 and held
that a trial court had the discretion to allow or disallow credit
against arrearages for voluntary expenditures incurred for support-
ing the child while the child lived with the parent requesting
credit.25 In both cases, the court applied the Goodson test, whether
justice required that credit be given under the facts of that partic-
ular case.26 In Simmons,27 the court affirmed the trial court's de-
nial of credit although the child lived with the parent requesting
credit almost half of the time during which the arrearages ac-
crued.2 8 The Simmons court justified its decision by quoting with
approval Gibson v. Gibson,29 a case denying a prospective credit
proportionate to the time the child was with the noncustodial par-
ent. "The fact that a child spends a certain amount of time with
22. Jarrell v. Jarrell, 241 N.C. 73, 84 S.E.2d 328 (1954) (per curiam); Lindsey
v. Lindsey, 34 N.C. App. 201, 237 S.E.2d 561 (1977).
23. "There is competent evidence in the Record to support His Honor's find-
ings of fact that the respondent acted in good faith in ... not making a payment
: . , while [the child] was living with him [about six weeks], and on that basis he
is only $35.00 in arrears . . . ." 241 N.C. at 74, 84 S.E.2d at 329. "Defendant is
entitled to have his obligation to [pay] plaintiff [child support] reduced . . . be-
cause [the child was] living with him." Lindsey, 34 N.C. App. at 204, 237 S.E.2d
at 563 (one child lived with the parent for 18 months, -the other for four years).
24. 32 N.C. App. 76, 231 S.E.2d 178 (1977).
25. Simmons, 74 N.C. App. 725, 329 S.E.2d 723 (1985); Jones, 52 N.C. App.
104, 278 S.E.2d 260 (1981).
In Jones, 52 N.C. App. 104, 278 S.E.2d 260 (1981), credit was allowed for a
portion of the amount of the child support payments due under the order for the
period of time the children stayed with the father during visitations (six weeks in
1977 and five weeks in 1979). In Goodson, 32 N.C. App. 76, 231 S.E.2d 178 (1977),
the court did not state whether the expenditures for clothing, food, recreation,
and medical treatment were incurred while the child lived with the parent claim-
ing credit.
In addition, in Walker v. Walker, 59 N.C. App. 485, 297 S.E.2d 125 (1982),
the court of appeals indicated that a noncustodial parent under a court-ordered
obligation to pay child support may be entitled to relief from payments which
accrued during a period of reconciliation between the parents. Id. at 489, 297
S.E.2d at 128.
26. Goodson, 32 N.C. App. at 81, 231 S.E.2d at 182.
27. 74 N.C. App. 725, 329 S.E.2d 723.
28. Id. at 726, 329 S.E.2d at 723.
29. 68 N.C. App. 566, 316 S.E.2d 99 (1984).
19871
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one parent does not necessarily mean . . . that his reasonable and
necessary living expenses are incurred proportionally.
30
On its face, section 50-13.10 appears to modify the Goodson
rules that allow retroactive modification in the court's discretion.
Section 50-13.10 precludes a trial court from granting a credit
against arrearages for support expenses incurred while the child
temporarily lived with a non-custodial parent requesting the credit
unless (1) the child was "living with" that parent pursuant to a
valid court order 3 or (2) that parent filed a motion requesting a
reduction before the arrearages accrued. 32 Under section 50-13.10,
if the court finds that the child was "living with" the non-custodial
parent pursuant to a court order, the Goodson rules do not oper-
ate; in effect, the statute automatically grants a total credit equal
to the support obligation for that period of time by excluding pay-
ments due during that time from the definition of arrearages. 33
The General Assembly, however, failed to define the term "liv-
ing with." The extent to which North Carolina appellate courts
will include court-ordered visitation in this term remains to be
seen. The courts could exclude all visitation periods from the defi-
nition of the term "living with" by limiting its application to court
30. Id. at 570, 316 S.E.2d at 103. See also Evans v. Craddock, 61 N.C. App.
438, 300 S.E.2d 908 (1983), a prospective credit case, quoting with approval Good-
son, 32 N.C. App. at 81, 231 S.E.2d at 182, "Credit is not likely to be appropriate
... for expenses incurred in entertaining or feeding the child during visitation
periods."
31. Under § 50-13.10, no arrearage accrues while the child lives with the par-
ent pursuant to a court order.
For purposes of this section, a child support payment or the relevant
portion thereof, is not past due, and no arrearage accrues ... during any
period when the child is living with the supporting party pursuant to a
valid court order or to an express or implied written or oral agreement
transferring primary custody to the supporting party.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.10(d)(3).
32. [A] past due child support payment . . . may not thereafter be va-
cated, reduced, or otherwise modified in any way for any reason ...
except that a child support obligation may be modified ... if, but only
if, a written motion is filed, and due notice is given to all parties either:
(1) before the payment is due or
(2) if the moving party is precluded by physical disability, mental inca-
pacity, indigency, misrepresentation of another party, or other compel-
ling reason from filing a motion before payment is due, then promptly
after the moving party is no longer so precluded.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.10(a) (emphasis added).
33. Supra note 31.
[Vol. 10:111
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orders providing for joint or shared custody arrangements. An as-
sumption that the trial court ordered visitation without adjusting
support liability during that time because it recognized that the
child's reasonable living expenses were not incurred proportionally
to the amount of time he spent with a parent could justify such a
limitation.3" On the other hand, the appellate courts could extend
the application of the term "living with" to include court-ordered
visitation periods of extended duration. Because temporary ab-
sences from the custodial parent's home do not affect the fixed ex-
penses of rearing a child, however, the court should limit the avail-
ability of this extraordinary remedy to exceptional cases involving
extended visitation periods.
Section 50-13.10 also precludes a court from using its discre-
tion under Goodson to allow or disallow a credit if the child was
living with the parent requesting credit as a result of an agreement
changing primary custody. In that situation, the statute once again
mandates a total credit.3 5 As a result of section 50-13.10, the Good-
son rules, allowing a discretionary credit for expenses incurred
while the child was living temporarily with the parent requesting
credit and not because of a change in primary custody, apply only
if the child was living with that parent by agreement, rather than
by court order. In addition, the statute precludes the court from
allowing a Goodson credit in that situation unless that parent filed
a prior motion or was precluded from filing the motion by (1)
physical disability; (2) mental incapacity; (3) indigency; (4) misrep-
resentation of another party; or (5) other compelling reason. 6
The statute provides no guidance for defining the "other com-
pelling reason" exception. It is doubtful that the prior case law al-
lowing a credit for support expenses incurred while the child tem-
porarily lived with the parent requesting credit by agreement 7 will
aid the courts when they construe the term "other compelling rea-
son." The statute limits the mandatory total credit for time spent
with the non-custodial parent by agreement to situations in which
the parties agreed to "transfer primary custody to the supporting
party. '3 8 This limitation, in conjunction with the obvious legisla-
tive intent to change the prior case law, demonstrates intent to
34. See supra note 30.
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.10(d)(3).
36. See supra note 32.
37. See supra text accompanying notes 20-30.
38. See supra discussion at note 35.
1987]
9
Massey: Using Hindsight to Change Child Support Obligations: A Survey of
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1987
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
prohibit discretionary Goodson retroactive changes in the absence
of a prior motion. On the other hand, one could argue that section
50-13.10 was the result of a congressional mandate by federal legis-
lation,3" rather than any state legislative desire to change prior
case law, and that the legislature intended to include situations
covered by the Goodson"° test of preventing an injustice in its
"compelling reason" exception to the prior motion requirement."1
Such an interpretation, however, ignores the plain meaning of the
statute, which requires a compelling reason for failing to file the
motion42 rather than a compelling reason for granting the credit. It
also ignores the federal mandate that prohibits retroactive modifi-
cation in the absence of a prior motion.
43
Section 50-13.10 apparently does not change the prior rule
that North Carolina courts had no power to reduce retroactively
court-ordered child support by ordering reimbursement of support
payments already made. In 1986, in a case of first impression, the
court of appeals held that a trial court lacked the authority to re-
duce retroactively a lump sum child support payment already paid
under a consent judgment." The trial court had ordered repay-
ment of a portion of the lump sum proportional to the ratio of the
length of time the child lived with the noncustodial parent before
attaining majority to the total time from entry of the consent judg-
39. The child support enforcement program established by Title IV of the
Social Security Act requires states to meet certain requirements to be eligible to
receive federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children funds. "A state plan for
child and spousal support must ... provide, to the extent required by section 666
of this title, that the state (a) shall have in effect all of the laws to improve child
support enforcement effectiveness which are referred to in that section .... " 42
U.S.C. § 654(20)(A) (1984).
In 1986, Congress added a new requirement that states must meet to comply
with the child support enforcement program:
Procedures which require that any payment or installation of support
under any child support order . . . is . . . (c) not subject to retroactive
modification by such state or by any other state; except that such proce-
dures may permit modification with respect to any period during which
there is pending a petition for modification, but only from the date that
notice of such petition has been given . . . to the obligee or (where the
obligee is the petitioner) to the obligor.
42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(9) (1986).
40. See supra text accompanying notes 14-30.
41. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.10(a). See supra note 32.
42. Id.
43. Supra note 39.
44. Reavis v. Reavis, 82 N.C. App. 77, 345 S.E.2d 460.
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ment to majority.4 5
2. Credit for Voluntary Expenditures Incurred While the
Child Was Living With the Custodial Parent
Two court of appeals cases reviewed whether credit should be
allowed for specific voluntary expenditures made when the child
was not living with the parent requesting credit. 6 In both cases,
the court used the Goodson guidelines"7 to determine the credit
issue. In Lynn v. Lynn, 8 the court allowed credit for a portion of
the cost of a furnace the noncustodial parent installed at the custo-
dial parent's request in the residence occupied by the children. In
Brower v. Brower,"9 noting a history of delinquent payments and
the custodial parent's lack of consent to the expenditures, the
court of appeals refused to allow credit for the cost of two automo-
biles for the children.
Under section 50-13.10, courts can allow a credit for voluntary
expenditures incurred while the child lived with the custodial par-
ent only if a motion was filed before the payment was due or the
noncustodial parent was precluded from filing such a motion."
B. Retroactive Reduction by Allowing Credit for Payments Due
After Termination of the Parental Duty. of Support
In addition to situations involving voluntary expenditures,
pre-section 50-13.10 case law authorized courts to reduce arrear-
ages due under a prior court order that accrued after the occur-
rence of an event that terminated the parental duty to support.
This question arose when a support order covered two or more
children and by its terms required continued payments 1 although
45. Id. at 79, 345 S.E.2d at 463.
46. Brower, 75 N.C. App. 425, 331 S.E.2d 170; Lynn, 44 N.C. App. 148, 260
S.E.2d 682.
47. See supra note 15.
48. 44 N.C. App. 148, 260 S.E.2d 682.
49. 75 N.C. App. at 434, 331 S.E.2d at 177. The court also refused to allow
credit for one child's earnings (on the ground that his parent waived his right to
the unemancipated child's earnings by consenting to the child's receipt of the
earnings) and for the parent's inability to claim his children as dependents for
income tax purposes. Id.
50. See supra note 32.
51. In Jarrell, 241 N.C. 73, 84 S.E.2d 328, the consent order stated the pay-
ments should continue "so long as [the] children are not self-supporting." In
Lindsey, 34 N.C. App. 201, 237 S.E.2d 561, the order required the support of the
1987]
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the parent's support obligation for one of the children had
terminated.
In the only North Carolina Supreme Court case on this issue,
Jarrell v. Jarrell, a per curiam opinion, one-of the children mar-
ried.52 The order did not state the amount to be paid for the sup-
port of each of the children individually. It merely provided for a
payment of "$100 per month for the support of [the] two chil-
dren.""3 Without discussion, the court held that the trial court
properly reduced the arrearages by one-half of the amount due
under the order for the period of time after the child's marriage.5"
By automatically reducing the payment by one-half, the court ig-
nored the possibility that the younger child's needs were greater
than $50 per month during the period after the marriage.
In three cases, the court of appeals approved a retroactive re-
duction on the ground that one of two children no longer was a
minor.5 In Lindsey v. Lindsey, the prior order specified the
amount of the parent's support obligation for each child individu-
ally.56 When the court determined the parent's liability for arrear-
ages, it merely noted that the noncustodial parent was entitled to
have his support obligation reduced by the amount specified in the
minor children and failed otherwise to state a terminating contingency. In
Brower, 75 N.C. App. 425, 427, 331 S.E.2d 170, 172, the order stated that the
payments should continue "until further order of the court." In Gates, 69 N.C.
App. 421, 423, 317 S.E.2d 402, 404, the confession of judgment stated that the
payments should be made until the youngest child reached 21, became self-sup-
porting, married, or died. Subsequently the age of majority was lowered to 18.
The court held that the intent of the judgment was "to provide support only until
the end of the legal obligation at emancipation." Gates, 69 N.C. App. at 427, 317
S.E.2d at 406.
52. Jarrell, 241 N.C. 73, 84 S.E.2d 328.
53. Id. at 74, 84 S.E.2d at 328.
54. Id.
55. Brower, 75 N.C. App. 425, 331 S.E.2d 170; Gates, 69 N.C. App. 421, 317
S.E.2d 402; Lindsey, 34 N.C. App. 201, 237 S.E.2d 561. In Tilley v. Tilley, 30 N.C.
App. 581, 227 S.E.2d 640 (1976), the father requested a retroactive reduction of
arrearages on the ground that the older child had reached 18. The court of ap-
peals stated that "[w]hether the trial court has the authority to retroactively re-
duce payments provided for child support by a prior order of the court is not
before us, since the court in the instant case made no retroactive change in the
• ..order." (citation omitted) Id. at 584, 227 S.E.2d at 642. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-
13.4(c) (1983) provides in part that "[p]ayments ordered for the support of a child
shall terminate when the child reaches the age of 18 . . ." unless limited statutory
exceptions apply.
56. Lindsey, 34 N.C. App. 201, 237 S.E.2d 561.
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order for that child for the period of time after she attained major-
ity. 7 The other two cases, Brower v. Brower and Gates v. Gates,
involved support orders that stated single aggregate amounts and
failed to identify separate amounts of support for each of two chil-
dren.58 The support orders also failed to specify the effect of termi-
nation of the parent's duty to support one of the children on his
obligation under the order. 9 In both cases, the court of appeals
remanded the order reducing the arrearages because the trial court
failed to make findings of fact relating to the younger child's needs
during the period after the older child reached majority.60 These
appear to be the only two cases applying the statutory standard of
a judicial finding of changed circumstances6 to retroactive modifi-
cation of child support due under a court order.
The new statute62 contains no provision authorizing a credit
against arrearages accruing after the parental duty to support ter-
minates because of a child's attainment of majority or marriage.
Prior case law makes it clear that, in such situations, the support-
ing parent cannot reduce unilaterally the aggregate support pay-
ment but instead must seek modification by the court. 3 It appears
57. Id. at 204, 237 S.E.2d 561.
58. Brower, 75 N.C. App. 425, 331 S.E.2d 170; Gates, 69 N.C. App. 421, 317
S.E.2d 402.
59. The order in Gates implied that it should have no effect. See infra note
63.
60. Brower, 75 N.C. App. at 433-34, 331 S.E.2d at 176; Gates, 69 N.C. App. at
430, 317 S.E.2d at 407-08.
61. "An order of a court of this State for support of a minor child may be
modified or vacated at any time, upon motion in the cause and a showing of
changed circumstances by either party or anyone interested." N.C. GEN. STAT. §
50-13.7(a).
62. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.10.
63. The reason underlying prohibition of unilateral modification was stated
in Gates, 69 N.C. App. at 428-29, 317 S.E.2d at 407, quoting Halcomb v. Halcomb,
352 So. 2d 1013, 1016 (La. 1977):
[U]nless automatic reduction, modification or termination is provided for
by operation of law, the award remains enforceable notwithstanding that
a cause for reduction may have occurred which would, upon proper suit,
warrant such a reduction. Support for this rule is found in a proper re-
gard for the integrity of judgments. Such a regard does not condone a
practice which would allow those cast in judgment to invoke self-help
and unilaterally relieve themselves of the obligation to comply. Any
other rule of law would greatly impair the sanctity of judgments and the
orderly processes of law. To condone such a practice would deprive the
party, in whose favor the judgment has been rendered, of an opportunity
to present countervailing evidence, and at the same time deny the judge
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that, in the absence of a statutory exception covering this situa-
tion, the statute's general prohibition of retroactive modification
"in any way for any reason""" precludes North Carolina courts
from granting such credits in the future, in the absence of a motion
filed before the arrearages accrued or one of the exceptions to the
prior motion requirement.
This omission could be a legislative oversight, especially when
considered in light of provisions effectively mandating a total
credit in the event of the child's death.65 More likely, the omission
reflects a legislative policy decision to place the burden on a parent
to assert in a timely manner his or her right to discontinue court-
ordered child support payments upon termination of the parental
support duty. Predictability of the attainment of majority justifies
placement of such a burden on that parent. Arguably marriage, es-
pecially the marriage of a minor, is not necessarily a foreseeable
occurrence. Under section 50-13.10(a)(2), however, the parent of a
minor whose marriage was unanticipated or previously undisclosed
can be excused from the statutory requirement of a prior motion.
Ignorance of the marriage would either qualify as "misrepresenta-
tion of another party" or "other compelling reason" under the stat-
ute. Likewise, the courts may construe the "other compelling rea-
son" exception to the prior motion requirement to include a
mistaken belief that the occurrence of an event terminating the
parental duty to support also terminated the obligation to continue
payments pursuant to the court order.
an opportunity to review the award in light of the alleged mitigating
cause which had developed since its rendition.
Accord Brower, 75 N.C. App. 425, 331 S.E.2d 170.
64. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.10(a), supra note 32.
65. "For purposes of this section, a child support paymcnt or the rele-
vant portion thereof, is not past due, and no arrearage accrues: (1) from
and after the date of the death of the minor child for whose support the
payment, or relevant portion, is made; (2) from and after the date of the
death of the supporting party ... "
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.10(d).
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III. RETROACTIVE MODIFICATION IN NORTH CAROLINA OF SUPPORT
PROVISIONS IN SEPARATION AGREEMENTS NOT INCORPORATED INTO
DIVORCE DECREES"6
A. By the Parties
Just as with any other contract, the parties may agree to mod-
ify child support provisions in their separation agreement and, in
addition, to make their modification retroactive. If the parties
choose to modify their separation agreement, however, they must
do so in writing and the modification must be acknowledged by
both parties before a certifying officer.67
B. By the Courts
North Carolina has long recognized the general rule that an
agreement or contract between the parents cannot deprive the
court of its inherent authority to protect the interests and provide
for the welfare of the minor children of the marriage.6 North Car-
olina courts, therefore, have the power to enter an independent
support order increasing or decreasing the amount agreed upon by
66. Retroactive modification of support provisions in separation agreements
incorporated into court orders after January 11, 1983, like consent judgments, will
be governed by the rules applicable to court-ordered support. Walters v. Walters,
307 N.C. 381, 298 S.E.2d 338 (1981); Tyndall v. Tyndall, 80 N.C. App. 722, 343
S.E.2d 284 (1986).
The pre-section 50-13.10 case of Reavis v. Reavis, 82 N.C. App. 77, 345
S.E.2d 460 (1986), applied Walters' modification rules to a consent judgment. In
Reavis, the court indicated that courts may refuse retroactive modification of a
negotiated agreement later made part of a consent judgment even though prior
case law allowed such modification of a judicially imposed support obligation
under similar circumstances. In Reavis, the court of appeals refused to allow ret-
roactive reduction of a lump-sum child support payment under a consent judg-
ment. The court noted general judicial reluctance to allow attacks on consent
judgments stemming from an assumption that parties who negotiate such agree-
ments are aware that circumstances (such as the child's residence) following entry
of the consent order might change. Id. at 82, 345 S.E.2d at 463.
67. Smith v. Smith, 225 N.C. 189, 34 S.E.2d 148 (1945); Greene v. Greene, 77
N.C. App. 821, 336 S.E.2d 430 (1985). But see Altman v. Munns, 82 N.C. App.
102, 345 S.E.2d 419 (1986) (implying that parol modifications are permissible by
holding that, to be an effective parol modification of a separation agreement, all
requisites of a contract must be met, including consideration).
68. See Thomas v. Thomas, 248 N.C. 269, 103 S.E.2d 371 (1958); McKaughn
v. McKaughn, 29 N.C. App. 702, 225 S.E.2d 616 (1976); Bottomley v. Bottomley,
82 N.C. App. 231, 346 S.E.2d 317 (1986).
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the parties in a valid separation agreement."9
A few North Carolina cases indicate that a trial court has the
power to give retroactive effect to a child support order that pro-
spectively changes the amount of the contractual obligation. These
decisions apparently applied some of the rules governing prospec-
tive changes of contractual child support to retroactive changes. 0
Therefore, it is necessary to examine briefly the rules governing
prospective changes. The amount of child support agreed upon by
the parties in a separation agreement cannot be prospectively in-
creased by a trial court in the absence of any evidence of the need
for such increase.7 1 The courts in cases involving prospective in-
creases presume that the amount agreed upon by the parties in the
contract is reasonable. The supreme court first articulated this pre-
sumption in 1963 in Fuchs v. Fuchs.71 The Fuchs presumption of
69. Id.; Richardson v. Richardson, 261 N.C. 521, 135 S.E.2d 532 (1964).
The court, however, has no power to modify child support provisions in the
contract itself without the parties' consent. Church v. Hancock, 261 N.C. 764, 136
S.E.2d 81 (1964).
The effect of this distinction is unclear. Apparently only the non-moving
party to the child support action can assert the availability of an independent
action to recover the difference between the amount required to be paid by the
child support order and the amount due under the separation agreement. In Rich-
ardson, 261 N.C. 521, 135 S.E.2d 532, the supreme court held that the plaintiff
who earlier counterclaimed for child support in her husband's action for divorce
could not later recover the difference between the amount paid under the order
and the amount due under the separation agreement because she elected her rem-
edy by bringing the action for child support. The court of appeals has stated in
dicta in two cases that an independent action to recover the difference is availa-
ble. In McKaughn, 29 N.C. App. 704, 706, 225 S.E.2d 616, 619 (1976), the court
stated that "Itihe judgment . . does not change plaintiffs contractual obliga-
tions under the separation agreement." In Bottomley, 82 N.C. App. at 235, 346
S.E.2d at 320, the court, citing McKaughn, 29 N.C. App. at 704, 225 S.E.2d at
618, stated that the effect of an order setting a lesser amount than provided for in
a separation agreement was "to limit [the custodial parent's] contempt remedy to
the sums provided for by the court order." "[I] the court allows the child's [cus-
todial parent] less money for support for [the] child than does the valid separa-
tion agreement between the child's parents, the remedy of the [custodial parent]
is to sue the [non-custodial parent] for breach of contract and obtain a judg-
ment for the difference." Id., citing 3 R. Lee, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW § 229
at 139 (4th ed. 1981) (emphasis supplied by the court). Both McKaughn and Bot-
tomley dealt with the issue of whether a trial court could order an amount lower
than the contractual amount in an independent action for child support; neither
case involved the appeal of a judgment for the difference.
70. See infra discussion at notes 76-86.
71. Williams v. Williams, 261 N.C. 48, 134 S.E.2d 227 (1964).
72. 260 N.C. at 639, 133 S.E.2d at 491.
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reasonableness can be rebutted by evidence that the amount of
support reasonably needed by the child at the time of the hearing
substantially exceeds the amount agreed upon in the separation
agreement.78 The court of appeals has not applied uniformly the
Fuchs presumption in cases involving prospective decreases.74 In
one of two cases, the court merely required a determination of the
child's reasonable needs and the parents' relative abilities to pay at
the time of the hearing, as it would if no prior separation agree-
ment existed.75
1. Retroactive Increases
Although North Carolina case law on this topic provides little
guidance to trial courts facing the issue, both appellate courts ap-
73. Boyd v. Boyd, 81 N.C. App. 71, 343 S.E.2d 581 (1986). For many years,
there was confusion as to the proof required to rebut the Fuchs presumption that
the amount of child support agreed upon in the separation agreement was reason-
able. Some court of appeals cases held that a showing of changed circumstances
between the time of the separation agreement and the date of the hearing was
necessary to rebut the presumption of reasonableness. See Hershey v. Hershey, 57
N.C. App. 692, 292 S.E.2d 141 (1982); Rabon v. Ledbetter, 9 N.C. App. 376, 176
S.E.2d 372 (1970). Other cases decided during the same time period, however,
held that the moving party was not required to show changed circumstances; he
was required only to show the amount reasonably required for the support of the
child at the time of the hearing. Walker v. Walker, 63 N.C. App. 644, 306 S.E.2d
485 (1983); Perry v. Perry, 33 N.C. App. 139, 234 S.E.2d 449, disc. rev. denied,
292 N.C. 730, 235 S.E.2d 784 (1977). The court of appeals attempted to clarify the
effect of the Fuchs presumption of reasonableness in Boyd.
[T]he moving party's only burden is to show the amount of support nec-
essary to meet the reasonable needs of the child at the time of the hear-
ing. Should the evidence establish. . .that such amount substantially ex-
ceeds the amount agreed upon in the separation agreement, such
evidence would necessarily rebut the presumption of reasonableness cre-
ated in Fuchs and establish the need for an increase. Absent such a
showing, the agreement of the parties will be deemed to be reasonable.
While evidence of a change in circumstances, involving a comparison of
actual expenditures and other circumstances between the time of the
separation agreement and that date of the hearing, may be relevant to
the issue of reasonableness, such evidence is not an absolute requirement
to justify an increase.
81 N.C. App. at 76, 343 S.E.2d at 585.
74. Bottomley, 79 N.C. App. 231, 346 S.E.2d 317. In McKaughn, 29 N.C.
App. 702, 225 S.E.2d 616, the court of appeals applied the Fuchs presumption but
required a showing of changed circumstances to rebut the presumption, citing
Rabon, 9 N.C. App. 376, 176 S.E.2d 372.
75. Bottomley, 82 N.C. App. 231, 346 S.E.2d 317.
1987]
17
Massey: Using Hindsight to Change Child Support Obligations: A Survey of
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1987
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
pear to recognize the availability of the remedy of retroactive in-
crease of contractual child support. No North Carolina case, how-
ever, has dealt with the issue of whether a court could retroactively
increase child support arrearages due under a separation agree-
ment. In addition, the appellate courts have never affirmed an or-
der retroactively increasing contractually agreed upon amounts of
already-paid child support.
The one supreme court opinion dealing with this issue seem-
ingly limits the remedy of retroactive increase of contractual child
support provisions to cases showing an emergency situation. In
Fuchs,76 the supreme court reversed the portion of the trial court's
order retroactively increasing the amount of child support paid
pursuant to the contract. The opinion, however, included only a
very brief, almost summary, discussion of the issue.
[T]he order making the increased allowance retroactive ... with-
out evidence of some emergency situation that required the ex-
penditure of sums in excess of the amounts paid by the plaintiff
for the support of his minor children, is neither warranted in law
nor equity."
In Calhoun v. Calhoun, the court of appeals indicated that it
would apply the Fuchs presumption of reasonableness to retroac-
tive changes as well.79 The Calhoun court held that the complaint
failed to state a cause of action in the absence of allegations sup-
porting either changed circumstances or the need for the custodial
parent to spend sums in excess of the amount received pursuant to
the separation agreement.80 In Boyd v. Boyd,8 1 the court of appeals
recognized the trial court's power to increase retroactively the con-
76. 260 N.C. 635, 133 S.E.2d 487.
77. Id. at 641, 133 S.E.2d at 492.
78. 7 N.C. App. 509, 172 S.E.2d 894 (1970).
79. Id. at 512, 172 S.E.2d at 896. The separation agreement in Calhoun re-
quired the father to make child support payments directly to the minor child and
did not contain any provision for payments to the custodial mother. The plaintiff
mother sued to set aside the portion of the agreement providing for payments to
the child and to recover actual sums she had expended on the child in the pist.
Id. at 510-11, 172 S.E.2d at 895.
80. The court also noted that the rule that the courts had the power to disre-
gard the contract to protect the interests of a minor child did not apply in this
case; the mother had waited until her son was 23 to bring her action to have the
contract disregarded and for reimbursement of actual expenditures on the son's
behalf. 7 N.C. App. at 513, 172 S.E.2d at 896.
81. 81 N.C. App. 71, 343 S.E.2d 581 (1986).
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tractually agreed-upon amount but reversed that portion of the or-
der because the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact
supporting the amount of the retroactive award and the date to
which the defendant's obligation was made retroactive. s2 The
court, however, provided no guidance for making such determina-
tions in the future.8"
2. Retroactive Decreases
One North Carolina case dealt with a retroactive decrease in
the amount of child support due under a separation agreement. In
Beverly v. Beverly,s ' the court applied the Goodson85 rule allowing
a trial court to apply a credit to offset arrearages due under a court
order for child support. In Beverly, the defendant reduced unilat-
erally the amount of his child support payments due under a sepa-
ration agreement when one of the children, who previously lived
with the plaintiff, went to live with the defendant. The plaintiff
sued for arrearages due under the contract. The court of appeals
held that to prevent an injustice the trial court should have set off
the defendant's contractual obligation by the amount he volunta-
rily expended in support of the child while the child lived with
him. The court was "persuaded by equitable considerations that
credit [was] necessary," noting that "[ilt is uncontradicted that
[the child] went to live with defendant at plaintiff's request."""
IV. RETROACTIVE CHANGES IN SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS THROUGH
THE CAUSES OF ACTION FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT
North Carolina courts can reimburse the custodial parent, a
third-party provider of necessaries, or the state for past expendi-
tures for the support of a minor child. A parent who previously
may have been unaware that he was a parent may suddenly face
not only a prospective obligation of child support but also liability
82. In this action by the mother for court-ordered child support, the trial
court increased the amount agreed upon in the separation agreement retroactively
although the father had been paying more than the separation agreement re-
quired during the time in question. 81 N.C. App. at 72, 343 S.E.2d at 583.
83. The court of appeals vacated the prospective increase because the trial
court's findings of fact regarding the parents' relative abilities to pay and the rea-
sonable needs of the children were insufficient. Id. at 82, 343 S.E.2d at 588.
84. 43 N.C. App. 60, 257 S.E.2d 682 (1979).
85. 32 N.C. App. 76, 231 S.E.2d 178 (1977). See supra discussion at notes 14-
17.
86. Beverly, 43 N.C. App. at 62-63, 257 S.E.2d at 684.
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for sums the plaintiff expended on the child in the past. Moreover,
a parent who has fully satisfied his child support obligation also, in
some circumstances, may face liability retroactively for additional
expenditures. Neither the existence of court-ordered or contractual
child support duties during the time for which reimbursement is
sought nor a prior demand upon the defendant to pay the support
costs sought in the reimbursement action is necessary. The ele-
ments of the causes of action for reimbursement and the statutes
of limitation governing those actions vary depending on the iden-
tity of the plaintiff.
A. Reimbursement of Child Support Furnished by a Parent:
Retroactive Child Support
A parent who previously provided the sole support of his or
her child may seek reimbursement of a portion of those expendi-
tures from the other parent.8 7 The North Carolina courts have la-
beled this cause of action "retroactive child support,"88 "back child
support," 89 and "reimbursement"; 90 this discussion will use the
term "retroactive child support." In a retroactive child support ac-
tion, the plaintiff seeks an order for reimbursement from defend-
ant for his share of plaintiff's past reasonably necessary expendi-
tures for support of their child.9 1 The cause of action is not one for
"arrearages," 9 because it is available only in the absence of a prior
87. North Carolina has joined at least seventeen other states in recognizing a
cause of action for reimbursement of child support furnished by a custodial par-
ent. See Annotation, Father's Liability for Support of Child Furnished After Di-
vorce Decree Which Awarded Custody to Mother But Made No Provision for
Support, 91 A.L.R.3d 530 (1979); Annotation, Father's liability for support of
child furnished after entry of decree of absolute divorce not providing for sup-
port, 69 A.L.R.2d 203 (1960); see also infra discussion at notes 91-145.
88. Plott v. Plott, 313 N.C. 63, 79, 326 S.E.2d 863, 873 (1985), afJ'ing in part,
modifying in part, rev'ing in part, 65 N.C. App. 657, 310 S.E.2d 51 (1983); Buff v.
Carter, 76 N.C. App. 145, 146, 331 S.E.2d 705, 706 (1985); Warner v. Lattimer, 68
N.C. App. 170, 175, 314 S.E.2d 789, 792 (1984); Wood v. Wood, 60 N.C. App. 178,
180, 298 S.E.2d 422, 423 (1982).
89. Warner, 68 N.C. App. at 174, 314 S.E.2d at 792; Wood, 60 N.C. App. at
179, 298 S.E.2d at 422.
90. Tidwell v. Booker, 290 N.C. 98, 116, 225 S.E.2d 816, 827 (1976); Stanley
v. Stanley, 51 N.C. App. 172, 180, 275 S.E.2d 546, 551, rev. den., 303 N.C. 182, 280
S.E.2d 454, cert. den., 454 U.S. 959 (1981); Hicks v. Hicks, 34 N.C. App. 128, 130,
237 S.E.2d 307, 309 (1977).
91. See supra notes 107-08.
92. Buff, 76 N.C. App. at 147-48, 331 S.E.2d at 707. Cf. Plott, 313 N.C. at 79,
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order or contract concerning child support payments.9" The cause
of action is available even though plaintiff made no prior demand
for reimbursement or child support upon defendant94 and even if
defendant made voluntary support payments during the time in
question.95
A limited number of North Carolina cases address this cause
of action.9 6 The supreme court first used it in 1947 in a case ex-
tending a father's duty to support a child who was mentally and
physically incapable of self-support beyond the date of the child's
majority.97 The court, however, failed to cite any authority for the
use of the remedy or to discuss its availability in that case. 98
The supreme court first expressly recognized the retroactive
child support action99 with regard to illegitimate children in Tid-
well v. Booker.100 In Tidwell, the supreme court based the cause of
326 S.E.2d at 873 (the court referred to the cause of action as "retroactive child
support" and later referred to the amount of "arrearages").
93. If prior court-ordered or contractual support obligations existed, the ac-
tion would be one for retroactive modification, not for retroactive child support.
94. Buff, 76 N.C. App. at 147-48, 331 S.E.2d at 707.
95. Warner, 68 N.C. App. 170, 314 S.E.2d 789 (1984).
96. There are nine cases. See supra notes 88-90 and infra note 97.
97. Wells v. Wells, 227 N.C. 614, 44 S.E.2d 31 (1947).
98. In Wells, the wife alleged in the complaint the right to recover the value
of "necessities and necessary services and attentions . . . furnished by plaintiff to
[the child] . . . ." Id. at 615, 44 S.E.2d at 32. The court held "that the allegations
of the complaint do state a cause of action" and "that the expenditures made by
the plaintiff since the son reached [majority] were impelled by necessity." Id. at
620, 44 S.E.2d at 35.
99. In Tidwell v. Booker, 290 N.C. 98, 225 S.E.2d 816 (1976), the court held
that the defendant was not estopped by the determination of paternity in a prior
criminal action for nonsupport from denying paternity in the subsequent civil ac-
tion for prospective child support and retroactive child support. Id. at 115, 225
S.E.2d at 826. The court then discussed the availability of an action for retroac-
tive child support because the question of the trial court's authority to require the
defendant to reimburse the child's mother for past support expenditures would
"necessarily arise upon such further proceeding in the district court [and the
court] deem[ed] it advisable upon the present appeal to determine those matters
also." Id. The discussion of the retroactive child support action, therefore, is actu-
ally obiter dictum in Tidwell.
100. 290 N.C. 98, 225 S.E.2d 816. In Tidwell, the supreme court referred to
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 49-15, which provided that the duties of the parents to support
an illegitimate child are the same, "and may be determined and enforced in the
same manner, as if the child were [a] legitimate child . "Id. at 108, 225 S.E.2d
at 822.
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action on section 50-13.4(b),"' which at that time provided: "(b) In
the absence of pleading and proof that circumstances of the case
otherwise warrant, the father, the mother . . . shall be liable, in
that order, for the support of a minor child . . . o Recognizing
that section 50-13.4(b) imposed the primary duty to support the
child upon the father, and a secondary duty upon the mother, the
court held that "[a] party secondarily liable for the payment of an
obligation, who is compelled by the default of the party primarily
liable therefore to pay it, may, by action brought within the period
of the applicable statute of limitations, compel the party primarily
liable to reimburse him for such expenditure.1 03 The Tidwell
court also noted that the statute of limitations for retroactive child
support actions would be the three-year statute applicable to lia-
bilities created by statute.0 4 Since Tidwell, the court of appeals
has recognized the cause of action with regard to both legitimate 0 5
and illegitimate children.10 6
1. Retroactive Child Support Actions Before the 1981
Amendment to Section 50-13.4(b)
From its inception in North Carolina, retroactive child sup-
port was clearly limited to recovery of the defendant's share of the
amount plaintiff actually expended in support of the child during
the time in question.10 7 When determining the defendant's share of
plaintiff's actual past expenditures, the courts considered the
needs of the child and the ability of the defendant to pay during
the time for which reimbursement was sought.0 ' As the action
101. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.4(b) (1983).
102. 290 N.C. at 115, 225 S.E.2d at 826.
103. Id. at 116, 225 S.E.2d at 827.
104. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(2) (1983). Tidwell, 290 N.C. at 116, 225 S.E.2d at
827. Therefore a plaintiff in a reimbursement action is limited to reimbursement
of amounts expended on the child's behalf in the three years immediately preced-
ing the suit for reimbursement. A new cause of action for reimbursement accrues
with each expenditure in the child's behalf. Id.
105. Plott, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863; Warner, 68 N.C. App. 170, 314
S.E.2d 789; Wood, 60 N.C. App. 178, 298 S.E.2d 422; Stanley, 51 N.C. App. 172,
275 S.E.2d 546; Hicks, 34 N.C. App. 128, 237 S.E.2d 307.
106. Buff, 76 N.C. App. 145, 331 S.E.2d 705.
107. Warner, 68 N.C. App. at 175, 314 S.E.2d at 792; Wood, 60 N.C. App. at
181, 298 S.E.2d at 424; Stanley, 51 N.C. App. at 180-81, 275 S.E.2d at 551; Hicks,
34 N.C. App. at 130, 237 S.E.2d at 309.
108. Buff, 76 N.C. App. at 146, 331 S.E.2d at 706; Stanley, 51 N.C. App. at
181-83, 275 S.E.2d at 552; Hicks, 34 N.C. App. at 130, 237 S.E.2d at 309.
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evolved, the court of appeals applied many of the same rules when
determining the extent of the defendant's retroactive liability as it
applied when determining liability for prospective child support.
The court used the same statutory factors'0 9 to arrive at the
amount of the defendant's liability for retroactive child support. 10
In the action for retroactive child support, the court also applied
the prospective child support rule which allows a trial court to con-
sider the defendant's earning capacity, rather than his actual earn-
ings, when determining his ability to pay."'
Because the existence of the cause of action was based on the
primary/secondary rationale of Tidwell,1"2 prior to the 1981
amendment of section 50-13.4, considerable doubt existed as to
whether a father could bring an action for retroactive child support
against a mother.
2. Retroactive Child Support Actions After the 1981
Amendment to Section 50-13.4
In June of 1981, the legislature amended section 50-13.4(b)" 3
to make both the father and the mother primarily liable for the
support of a minor child in the absence of pleading and proof that
the circumstances warranted otherwise. The legislature also
amended section 50-13.4(c)" 4 to require the court to give due re-
109. Payments ordered for the support of a minor child shall be in such
amount as to meet the reasonable needs of the child for health, educa-
tion and maintenance, having due regard to the estates, earnings, condi-
tions, accustomed standard of living of the child and the parties, and
other facts of the particular case.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.4(c) (1984).
110. Tidwell, 290 N.C. at 115, 225 S.E.2d at 826; Buff, 76 N.C. App. at 147,
331 S.E.2d at 706; Warner, 68 N.C. App. at 172, 314 S.E.2d at 791; Stanley, 51
N.C. App. at 181, 275 S.E.2d at 552.
111. Stanley, 51 N.C. App. at 179, 275 S.E.2d at 551. The court, quoting
Robinson v. Robinson, 10 N.C. App. 463, 468, 179 S.E.2d 144, 147 (1971), stated:
To base an award on capacity to earn rather than actual earnings, there
should be a finding based on evidence that the husband is failing to exer-
cise his capacity to earn because of a disregard of his marital obligation
to provide reasonable support for his . . . children. Conrad v. Conrad,
252 N.C. 412, 113 S.E.2d 912.
51 N.C. App. at 179, 275 S.E.2d at 550.
112. Hicks, 34 N.C. App. 128, 237 S.E.2d 307; Stanley, 51 N.C. App. 172, 275
S.E.2d 546; Wood, 60 N.C. App. 178, 298 S.E.2d 422. See supra discussion at note
102.
113. 1981 N.C. SEss. LAWS CH. 613 s. 1.
114. Id.
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gard to "the child care and homemaker contribution of each party"
in setting the amount of child support payments.
The first case dealing with the amendments' effect on the
cause of action for retroactive child support also held that the
cause of action was available to a father against a mother.115 Plott
v. Plott and subsequent cases" 6 show that the cause of action for
reimbursement survived the amendments to section 50-13.4 de-
spite the action's origin in the now obsolete primary/secondary lia-
bility language of the pre-1981 version of that statute. Plott,1 17
Warner v. Latimer,"8 and Buff v. Carter"9 indicate that the 1981
amendment did not affect the cause of action other than by (1)
extending the availability of the action to a father; 120 (2) creating
the difficulty of allocating the amount of child support between the
parents under the statute's new dual primary liability rule; 2' and
(3) introducing consideration of the factor of homemaking
contributions.1 2
The post-1981 cases still use many of the same factors and
rules, primarily section 50-13.4(b) and (c) and the case law inter-
preting it, for determining the amount of defendant's retroactive
liability as trial courts use for determining the amount of defend-
ant's liability for prospective child support. In Plott, both the
court of appeals' 23 and the supreme court 24 indicated that in ret-
roactive child support actions the trial court should apply prospec-
tive support rules that govern the allocation of the duty of child
support between the parties. The court of appeals also applied the
statute governing the form of child support payments to retroac-
tive child support actions.12 5 In Buff v. Carter 26 the court noted
115. Plott, 65 N.C. App. 657, 310 S.E.2d 51 (1983), aff'd in part, modified in
part, rev'd on other grounds in part, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).
116. Warner v. Latimer, 68 N.C. App. 170, 314 S.E.2d 789 (1984); Buff v.
Carter, 76 N.C. App. 145, 331 S.E.2d 705 (1985).
117. 65 N.C. App. 657, 659, 310 S.E.2d 51, 53.
118. 68 N.C. 170, 173, 314 S.E.2d 789, 791.
119. 76 N.C. App. 145, 331 S.E.2d 705.
120. Plott, 65 N.C. App. at 660, 310 S.E.2d at 53.
121. See Plott, 313 N.C. 63, 68, 326 S.E.2d 863, 867.
122. Plott, 65 N.C. App. at 660, 310 S.E.2d at 53.
123. Id.
124. 313 N.C. at 69, 326 S.E.2d at 867.
125. In Warner, 68 N.C. App. 170, 314 S.E.2d 189, the court of appeals cited
50-13.4(e) in its discussion of form of payment of reimbursement: "Payment for
the support of a minor child shall be paid by lump sum payment, periodic pay-
ments, or transfer of title or possession of personal property of any interest
[Vol. 10:111
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that section 50-13.4(e) vests in the trial judge broad discretionary
powers when determining the form of payment.12 Only two forms
of payment for retroactive child support, lump sum awards and
periodic payments, appear in the North Carolina cases. In the two
cases in which the trial judge ordered periodic payments after de-
termining the total amount of defendant's liability, the appellate
court vacated the order for reasons other than the form of the
payment. 12 8
3. Distinctions Between Retroactive and Prospective Child
Support Actions
The courts use many prospective support rules to determine
whether a defendant is liable for retroactive child support, and to
what extent. However, retroactive and prospective child support
actions differ in four important respects: the court's focus; the
measure of liability; the equities of the case; and the availability of
attorney's fees.
The focus in retroactive and prospective child support actions
is the main distinction. In prospective support cases, the court uses
present expenditures on behalf of the child to project the child's
future needs.12 9 Applicable law balances the child's and the par-
ents' welfare by limiting the extent of defendant's support obliga-
tion by his ability to pay.130 The court's primary concern is fairness
to all concerned, the parents and child.' 1
therein, or a security interest in or possession of real property, as the court may
order." The court also noted that the forms of payment listed in the statute are
not mutually exclusive.
126. Buff, 76 N.C. App. 145, 331 S.E.2d 705.
127. In Buff, the defendant contended that the order requiring him to pay a
lump sum of $9325.50 within 60 days was in error since his financial affidavit
showed that he was unable to pay that amount in so short a time. The court
already had remanded the retroactive child support order for new findings and,
therefore, refused to address the defendant's contention. The court noted, how-
ever, "that under G.S. 50-13.4(e) the trial judge has broad discretion in determin-
ing the manner of payment, and his order shall be upheld unless there is an abuse
of discretion." Id. at 147, 331 S.E.2d at .707.
128. Plott, 65 N.C. App. 657, 310 S.E.2d 51; Hicks, 34 N.C. App. 128, 237
S.E.2d 307.
129. See Coble v. Coble, 300 N.C. 708, 268 S.E.2d 185 (1980). See, e.g., Plott,
313 N.C. at 68-69, 326 S.E.2d at 867; Warner, 68 N.C. App. at 172, 314 S.E.2d at
791.
130. Id. See, e.g., Stanley, 51 N.C. App. at 179, 275 S.E.2d at 550-51.
131. Coble, 300 N.C. 708, 711, 268 S.E.2d 185, 189 (1980).
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In contrast, because the expenditures for the child's support in
retroactive child support determinations already have been made,
the present or future welfare of the child is not in issue. The
court's primary concern is which of the two parents should equita-
bly bear the already-paid expenses of rearing the child.13 2 As the
court in Hicks v. Hicks133 stated, in a retroactive child support ac-
tion, the trial court is not free to determine what the defendant
should have expended on the child in the past. The court is lim-
ited to a determination of what the defendant's share of plaintiff's
actual expenditures should be,13' even if the past actual expendi-
tures failed to meet the child's reasonable needs.
Another distinction is the measure of liability. In a prospective
support action there are two limits on liability. The trial court can-
not order an amount of support greater than the parent's share of
the child's reasonable needs or the parent's ability to pay. 35 In
contrast, in a retroactive support action, there are three limits on
liability: the child's reasonable needs during the time for which re-
imbursement is sought;136 the parent's ability to pay during that
time; and the actual past expenditures for support of the child.13 7
In retroactive support actions, the court may be prejudiced
against the defendant initially because of the nature of the cause
of action; the court is usually confronted by a defendant who has
established a pattern of refusing to fulfill his legal obligation to
support his child. If the plaintiff in fact unsuccessfully attempted
to force the defendant to support his child in the past, the fact
that the efforts were made and that the defendant evaded those
efforts may affect the trial court. For example, in Stanley,3 8 al-
though the defendant father earned substantial sums of money
and was capable of supporting his child, he successfully evaded
plaintiff's numerous attempts to serve him with legal process for
132. See supra note 107.
133. 34 N.C. App. 128, 237 S.E.2d 307 (1977).
134. Id. at 130, 237 S.E.2d at 309.
135. See supra notes 129-30.
136. The court must determine which actual expenditures were reasonably
necessary for the child's support. Buff, 76 N.C. App. at 146, 331 S.E.2d at 706.
137. See supra discussion at notes 133-34. Therefore the court must make
findings of fact of what the actual reasonable past expenditures were during the
time for which reimbursement is sought, as well as findings of fact regarding abil-
ity to pay when determining defendant's share of actual past expenditures. Hicks,
34 N.C. App. 128, 237 S.E.2d 307.
138. 51 N.C. App. 172, 275 S.E.2d 546.
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about thirteen years. The defendant's history of evading service of
process clearly affected the court of appeals' review of the amount
of defendant's share of the child's past reasonable needs.1"" In ad-
dition, the court of appeals affirmed an order containing findings
of fact which lacked the specificity usually required in support
orders.14
The plaintiff in an action for prospective support may recover
attorney's fees if statutory requirements are satisfied. 41 Although
139. In its review of the amount of defendant's share of support, the Stanley
court employed the seldom used "other facts of the particular case" factor from §
50-13.4(c). The court stated that:
while the defendant's ability to pay and his earning capacity are factors
to be considered, they are not controlling. The [trial] court may also con-
sider the conduct of the parties and the equities of the case. In this case
it would be inequitable to allow the defendant to prevail on his argument
that the mother should have based her expectations for reimbursement
solely on his ability to pay where the record clearly shows that he moved
quite often and went for long periods, sometimes years, without contact-
ing his child or his ex-wife, thereby defeating her attempts to force him
to support his child and preventing her from determining what his abil-
ity to pay was. In addition, defendant readily admitted that even during
the time that he was earning substantial salaries, and therefore could
have supported the child, he chose not to do so. A mother, who was
forced, of necessity, to be the sole provider of support and maintenance
of her child for fifteen years, should not be required to measure her ex-
penditures in the child's behalf by guessing about the extent of the de-
faulting and absent father's ability to pay or earning capacity.
Stanley, 51 N.C. App. at 182-83, 275 S.E.2d at 552-53.
140. The defendant in Stanley also continued evasive tactics after he was
served by failing to comply with plaintiff's discovery requests for records of his
past income and living expenses and by testifying in a vague and confusing man-
ner on these issues. As a result of defendant's pattern of evasion, the court of
appeals relaxed its requirement that the trial court make specific findings of fact
regarding defendant's ability to pay. "Although the trial court's findings support-
ing his conclusion that the defendant had the ability to provide $400 per month
in support of his child lack the degree of specificity which would be required in an
action for prospective child support, they are adequate in this action for reim-
bursement due to the difficulty of proving what defendant's past income and liv-
ing expenses were." Stanley, 51 N.C. App. at 182, 275 S.E.2d at 552.
141. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.6:
COUNSEL FEES IN ACTIONS FOR CUSTODY AND SUPPORT OF MINOR CHILDREN. -
In an action or proceeding for the custody or support, or both, of a minor
child, including a motion in the cause for the modification or revocation
of an existing order for custody or support, or both, the court may in its
discretion order payment of reasonable attorney's fees to an interested
party acting in good faith who has insufficient means to defray the ex-
pense of the suit. Before ordering payment of a fee in a support action,
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the discussion in Tidwel1142 was dicta, 4- the supreme court stated,
without explanation, that attorney's fees should not be available in
a proceeding for retroactive child support."4 No other North Caro-
lina case has considered the issue of whether attorney's fees should
be available. 145
B. Reimbursement of Necessaries Provided by a Third Party:
The Doctrine of Necessaries
At early common law, the "doctrine of necessaries ' 146 provided
a method of enforcing a father's 1 47 duty to support his child. 148
the court must find as a fact that the party ordered to furnish support
has refused to provide support which is adequate under the circum-
stances existing at the time of the institution of the action or proceeding;
provided however, should the court find as a fact that the supporting
party has initiated a frivolous action or proceeding the court may order
payment of reasonable attorney's fees to an interested party as deemed
appropriate under the circumstances.
142. 290 N.C. 98, 225 S.E.2d 816.
143. Supra note 100.
144. G.S. § 50-13.6 provides that in any action for the support of a minor
child '. . the court may in its discretion order payment of reasonable
attorney's fees . . .' if the court finds as a fact that the party ordered to
furnish support has refused to do so. We think the proper construction of
this statute is that it applies to a proceeding to compel the future sup-
port of the child, not to a proceeding to compel reimbursement for past
payments made by a party secondarily liable for such child's support.
TidweU, 290 N.C. at 116-17, 225 S.E.2d at 827.
145. Warner v. Latimer, 68 N.C. App. 170, 314 S.E.2d 789, did involve an
attorney's fee issue. The trial court in Warner awarded prospective and retroac-
tive child support and attorney's fees. The court of appeals expressly limited its
examination of the attorney fee issue to the defendant's assignment of error con-
cerning the finding and conclusion that plaintiff had insufficient means to defray
the expense of the action. See supra note 141. The court of appeals in Warner did
not indicate whether the award for attorney's fees included services rendered in
connection with the claim for retroactive child support; nor did it comment on the
availability of attorney's fees in a retroactive support action.
146. Alamance County Hospital v. Neighbors, 315 N.C. 362, 338 S.E.2d 87
(1986), rev'g 68 N.C. App. 771, 315 S.E.2d 779 (1984).
147. See id.; Holland v. Hartley, 171 N.C. 376, 88 S.E. 507 (1916); Howell v.
Solomon, 167 N.C. 588, 83 S.E. 609 (1914); P.J. Hunycutt & Co. v. Thompson, 159
N.C. 29, 74 S.E. 628 (1912); Everitt v. Walker, 109 N.C. 129, 13 S.E. 860 (1891).
148. The common law doctrine of necessaries also provided a method for en-
forcing a husband's duty to support his wife. See North Carolina Baptist Hosps.
v. Harris, 319 N.C. 347, 354 S.E.2d 471 (1987) (overruling Presbyterian Hosps. v.
McCartha, 66 N.C. App. 177, 310 S.E.2d 409, disc. rev. improvidently allowed,
312 N.C. 485, 322 S.E.2d 761 [1984]); Robertson v. Robertson, 218 N.C. 447, 11
138 [Vol. 10:111
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When a third party provided necessaries 149 to the child, the father,
as a matter of law, was made directly responsible to the third-
party provider. 150 The availability of the remedy was not depen-
dent on a contractual relationship between the father and the
third-party provider.151 Traditionally, to recover under the doc-
trine, the third-party supplier of necessaries merely had to prove
S.E.2d 318 (1940); Sibley v. Gilmer, 124 N.C. 631, 32 S.E. 964 (1899); Pool v.
Everton, 50 N.C. (5 Jones) 241 (1858); McClure v. McClure, 64 N.C. App. 318, 307
S.E.2d 212 (1983), disc. rev. denied, 310 N.C. 308, 312 S.E.2d 651 (1984).
149. "[Tlhe third party provider must . . . show that the services or goods
provided were legal necessaries . . ." Alamance Co. Hosp., 315 N.C. at 370, 338
S.E.2d at 92. "Precisely what is meant by the term 'necessaries' can change with
the times and the family's station in life . . . ." Alamance Co. Hosp., 315 N.C. at
365, 338 S.E.2d at 89 (holding that medical treatment was a legal necessary).
"[Necessaries include] clothing and food, and such reasonable incidental ex-
penses, such as medical bills, schoolbooks, and things of that kind, that [are] rea-
sonably necessary for the maintenance and comfort of [the child] in the station of
life in which [he or she was] being reared." Howell v. Solomon, 167 N.C. at 592,
83 S.E. at 610.
What constitutes necessities depends upon the facts and circumstances
of the particular case. They include food, clothing, lodging, medical care
and proper education. They are not limited to those things which are
absolutely necessary to sustain life, but extend to articles that are rea-
sonably necessary for the proper and suitable maintenance of the child in
view of his social station in life, the customs of the social circle in which
he lives or is likely to live and the fortune possessed by him and his
parents.
Bethea v. Bethea, 43 N.C. App. 372, 375, 258 S.E.2d 796, 799 (1979) (dealing with
prospective modification of child support).
Necessaries, under the common law doctrine, were traditionally defined as
"goods." See H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS, § 6.3 at 191 (1968). But
even early North Carolina cases allowed reimbursement for services rendered to
the child under the doctrine. See Holland v. Hartley, 171 N.C. 376, 88 S.E. 507
(board); P.J. Hunycutt & Co. v. Thompson, 159 N.C. 29, 74 S.E. 628 (burial
expenses).
150. "[T]he third party provider's right to recover against the parent is based
upon the child's right to support. . . ." Alamance Co. Hosp., 315 N.C. at 370, 338
S.E.2d at 92. "The father's duty of support is . . . an obligation imposed by law
which arises from his status as father." Id. at 365, 338 S.E.2d at 89. "Liability
under this theory was quasi-contractual in nature." Id. at 367, 338 S.E.2d at 90,
citing H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS, § 6.3 (1968). See also Howell v.
Solomon, 167 N.C. at 592, 83 S.E. at 611 ("quasi contract"); Thompson, 159 N.C.
at 32, 74 S.E. at 630 ("implied contract").
151. Alamance Co. Hosp., 315 N.C. at 368, 338 S.E.2d at 90-91. In Holland,
171 N.C. 376, 88 S.E. 507, the remedy was an alternative claim to the contract
claim. In Everitt, 109 N.C. 129, 13 S.E. 860, the court indicated that a claim based
on a contract and the implied liability claim were alternate remedies.
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that: (1) the goods supplied were "necessaries"; 152 (2) the father
failed or refused to provide them;15 and (3) the third-party pro-
vider furnished the goods or services with an expectation of com-
pensation.1 5 4 The father could defeat the third-party provider's
claim for reimbursement by proving that he had no duty to sup-
port the child at the time the goods or services were provided 55 or
that he was prevented from performing his parental duty of sup-
port by the provider's wrongful conduct. 5
152. Supra note 150.
153. Alamance Co. Hosp., 315 N.C. 362, 338 S.E.2d 87.
154. Apparently, charity is its own reward. In Everitt v. Walker, 109 N.C.
129, 13 S.E. 860, the child's aunt promised her dying sister, the child's mother,
that she would care for and support the child after the mother's death. The
child's father was an inmate of an insane asylum. When the aunt sued his guard-
ian for reimbursement several years later, the supreme court stated "[s]he could
not support the child from motives of charity and love for her departed sister
without any intention of charging the father for the same, and afterwards ...
compel him to pay her for her good work of love and charity. She had, in such
case, no valid claim at law or in equity." Id. at 132, 13 S.E. at 861.
155. Holland v. Hartley, 171 N.C. 376, 88 S.E. 507; Thompson, 159 N.C. 29,
74 S.E. 628. The common law duty of a father to support his child terminated at
the child's emancipation and for other reasons such as the father's death. See
generally 3 R. Lee NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW §§ 229, 233 (1981). In Holland,
the third-party provider's claim based on the doctrine of necessaries for boarding
the child failed because the father proved he and his 18-year-old son mutually
agreed to the child's total emancipation. In Thompson, the father attempted to
defend by proving his child was emancipated. The supreme court recognized a
distinction between "total" emancipation, which terminates the parental duty to
support, and "partial" emancipation, which does not.
The mere fact that a child is living away from home, with the consent of
the parent, does not relieve the parent from liability for necessaries fur-
nished to the child, and the parent is liable, where his misconduct or
abuse has driven the child to leave him; but ordinarily, where there is no
fault upon the part of the parent, a child who voluntarily abandons the
parent's home, for the purpose of seeking its fortune in the world, or to
avoid parental discipline and restraint, forfeits the claim to support, and
the parent is under no obligation to pay therefor. A boy may be emanci-
pated for some purposes, and may not be emancipated for others.
Thompson at 31, 74 S.E. at 629.
156. Howell v. Solomon, 168 N.C. 92, 83 S.E. 609. In Howell, the father de-
feated the children's maternal grandmother's claim for compensation for support
and maintenance of the children by proving that his mother-in-law had driven
"him from his home, which she had made unhappy by her intolerance, quarrel-
some disposition, and complete domination, and that she, in various ways, not
only obstructed him, but rendered it impossible for him to get possession of his
children, or communicate with them, so that he could perform his legal duty to
them, when he was, at all times, ready and willing to do so." Id. at 593, 83 S.E. at
140 [Vol. 10:111
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Despite the existence today of statutory remedies for child
support, 67 North Carolina still recognizes the common law remedy
available to a third-party provider of necessaries against a par-
ent 168 who failed or refused to provide such necessaries to his or
her child.5 9 The use of statutory remedies, however, can affect the
availability of the common law remedy to third-party providers. In
Alamance Co. Hospital v. Neighbors,'6 0 the court held that the
parent's payment of court-ordered child support during the time
the necessaries were provided to the child did not bar recovery
under the common law doctrine as a matter of law.'"' However,
when determining whether the doctrine of necessaries provides a
remedy to the third-party provider, the trier of fact'62 must con-
sider payments made by the parent pursuant to a court order as a
factor influencing the determination of whether the parent failed
to provide necessaries to his or her child. 163
612.
157. See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-322 (1986) (criminal sanctions for
nonsupport), 50-13.4 (civil remedy for child support).
158. Alamance Co. Hosp. v. Neighbors involved a claim against a father, but
the court, citing the gender neutralization of the North Carolina child support
statutes, discussed the availability of the cause of action against a "parent." 315
N.C. at 367, 338 S.E.2d at 89-90. The next year, the supreme court also made the
spousal doctrine of necessaries gender neutral in North Carolina Baptist Hosps. v.
Harris, 319 N.C. 347, 354 S.E.2d 471, by holding that the doctrine could be used
to impose liability on a wife for necessaries (medical treatment) provided to her
husband by a third party.
159. Alamance Co. Hosp., 315 N.C. 362, 338 S.E.2d 87.
160. Id.
161. The father in Alamance Co. Hosp. apparently did not know that his
child had received the medical treatment. Id. at 364, 338 S.E.2d at 88.
162. The issue in Alamance Co. Hosp. was whether the grant of summary
judgment in the father's favor was proper, 315 N.C. at 365, 338 S.E.2d at 89;
therefore the supreme court referred to the trial court's determination of whether
the parent had failed to provide necessaries. Alamance Co. Hosp., 315 N.C. at
370, 338 S.E.2d at 92. Parties to a claim based on the common law doctrine of
necessaries have the right to a jury trial. Several of the earlier cases concerning
the doctrine involved jury trials. Holland v. Hartley, 171 N.C. 376, 88 S.E. 507;
Howell v. Solomon, 167 N.C. 588, 83 S.E. 609; P.J. Hunycutt & Co. v. Thompson,
159 N.C. 29, 74 S.E. 628.
163. The court rejected the father's contention that because the court order
named a single sum for "support and maintenance" and did not additionally re-
quire him to pay the child's medical expenses, his entire obligation to provide
medical expenses to his child was included in his weekly child support payment.
Alamance Co. Hosp., 315 N.C. at 368, 338 S.E.2d at 92. The court noted that
there was a sharp division of opinion among the other jurisdictions that consid-
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C. Reimbursement For Public Assistance Provided by the State
Under Chapter 110, section 135 of the North Carolina General
Statutes,1 6 4 a parent's receipt of public assistance on behalf of his
or her child creates a debt due the state by the responsible parents
of the child. The county has the authority and the duty to pursue
an action against a parent responsible for the maintenance of the
child and to recover amounts paid by the county for support of the
child. 6 ' The county may bring the action in the name of the par-
ent receiving aid or in its own name. In either case, the parent
receiving aid is required to cooperate with the county in the trial of
the action.166 No prior demand upon the defendant to support the
child is necessary in this cause of action. 67
If there is no prior court order for child support, "[tihe only
limitations in section 110-135 on the extent of reimbursement for
which judgment may be obtained relate to the defendant's finan-
cial ability to furnish support during the relevant period of
time."'6 8 However, if a prior child support order existed during the
time of receipt of public assistance, "the debt shall be limited to
the amount specified in such court order."'19 In Wilkes County v.
Gentry, 70 the supreme court held that a lump sum settlement in
an action for criminal nonsupport of an illegitimate child did not
bar the county from bringing an action for reimbursement of pub-
lic assistance because the settlement did not relieve the defendant
of his responsibility for further support.
Section 110-136 provides a five-year statute of limitations for
this cause of action for reimbursement of public assistance.' 7 ' The
ered this defense to the cause of action for reimbursement by a third-party pro-
vider of necessaries.
164. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-135 (1985).
165. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 110-130, -138 (1985).
166. For a description of the federal statutes and regulations requiring the
state to establish and implement the Child Support Enforcement Program and
this cause of action for reimbursement, see State ex rel. Crews v. Parker, 82 N.C.
App. 419, 346 S.E.2d 270, rev. granted, 318 N.C. 420, 349 S.E.2d 605 (1986).
167. State ex rel. Terry v. Marrow, 71 N.C. App. 170, 321 S.E.2d 575 (1984)
(defendant had no notice that he was the alleged father of the child until almost
twelve years after the birth of the child and no prior demand for support had
been made).
168. Marrow, 71 N.C. App. at 175, 321 S.E.2d at 578.
169. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-135 (Cum. Supp. 1985).
170. 311 N.C. 580, 319 S.E.2d 224 (1984).
171. "[N]o action to collect such debt shall be commenced after the expira-
tion of five years subsequent to the receipt of the last grant of public assistance."
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county may claim reimbursement for all public assistance granted
after June 30, 1975, provided there is no five-year gap in payments
of public assistance. 7 '
V. CONCLUSION
The legislature substantially altered the prior case law gov-
erning retroactive modification of court-ordered child support obli-
gations by enacting section 50-13.10. By requiring the parent seek-
ing retroactive modification to file the motion before the payment
to be modified is due, the new statute severely limits a North Car-
olina court's discretion to grant a credit against arrearages due
under a prior court order.17' The statute's definition of arrearages
also eliminates a court's discretion to order a partial rather than a
total credit in some situations."" Additionally, the new statute
does not allow a credit for payments due under the terms of a prior
court order for an aggregate amount after a parent's duty to sup-
port one of his children has terminated due to the child's marriage
or attainment of majority, unless the parent requesting credit filed
a motion before the arrearages accrued or can show a statutorily
recognized excuse for failing to file the motion. 175
The new statute, however, does not affect other retroactive
changes in child support obligations. North Carolina case law has
recognized the authority of a court to order such retroactive
changes of contractual support obligations,1 7 6 as well as to order
retroactive changes in the form of the reimbursement remedies: re-
imbursement to a parent of past expenditures on a child's behalf in
the absence of a contract or a court order;17 7 reimbursement to a
third-party provider of necessaries under the common law doctrine
of necessaries;17 8 and reimbursement to the state of public assis-
tance it provides for a child's support.17 9 Through its use of this
miscellany of remedies, a court has the power to use hindsight to
correct history, albeit to a narrow extent. Careful exercise of this
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-136.
172. Marrow, 71 N.C. App. 170, 321 S.E.2d 575.
173. See supra discussion at notes 31-50.
174. See supra discussion at notes 51-65.
175. See supra discussion at note 65.
176. See supra discussion at notes 68-86.
177. See supra discussion at notes 87-145.
178. See supra discussion at notes 146-163.
179. See supra discussion at notes 164-172.
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power can force a recalcitrant parent to pay for past omissions or
can relieve an overburdened parent from a potentially unjust
liability.
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